I. INTRODUCTION
International civil litigation shares with complex litigation, of which it is often a part, 1 increasing practical importance and substan tial theoretical interest. In their recently published and extremely val uable book on international civil litigation, Gary Born and David Westin posit that U.S. courts have "begun to develop a distinct, cohe sive body of law" (p. 1) and that there is an "emerging field of interna tional civil litigation" (p. 3). Although the authors have organized the book so as to treat nine topics in a way that "track[ s] the course of lawsuits involving foreign parties in U.S. courts,"2 they also identify and trace the influence of five "common" or "basic themes that fre quently recur in international civil litigation" (p. 3). These common themes, in their minds, make international civil litigation a fi eld rather than a collection of topics.
This scheme of organization is felicitous, offering both detailed treatment of the most important practical problems in international civil litigation and recurrent opportunities to think about unifying themes. The book is as much a treatise as it is a collection of materials for course study, reflecting not only an extraordinary bibliographic achievement3 but also the ambition of the authors, practitioner/schol ars who, in the best tradition of international lawyers, have made nu merous contributions to knowledge.4 As a result, In ternational Civil Litigation should quickly both stimulate and become the standard text for courses in law schools, and it is an essential volume for the libraries of firms involved in international practice. It is also a good place for scholars interested in expanding their horizons, whether from a base in domestic or in international law, to begin to think about problems at the "crossroads."5
As one such scholar, whose base lies in the domestic law of proce dure (including conflicts and evidence), I have found it fruitful, if not necessary, to approach In ternational Civil Litigation by considering the roles of domestic analogies. Certainly, as the authors contem plated, this has proved a useful pedagogical strategy. Most students come to the study of international litigation after learning the rules governing domestic litigation. Even if only as a concession to the shortness of life, initiates look for the familiar as a means to grasp the unfamiliar, and domestic analogies can effectively stress continuities and highlight discontinuities. In this case "students" includes many, perhaps most, teachers and practitioners of international civil litiga tion, for whom the approach should also prove congenial. Finally, it is a useful perspective from which to judge the authors' claim that there is, or is about to be, a fi eld here in the sense of a discretely identifiable "law of international civil litigation" (p. 3), as well as to address the implicit normative questions: should there be such a field and, if so, what should it contain?
In pursuing these inquiries, I do not mean to question the utility of the course of study offered in International Civil Litigation. On the contrary, as I have already suggested, the authors' materials, including their penetrating questions and textual analyses, make a compelling case for the systematic study of the problems presented in litigation that involves foreign parties. I am persuaded, in other words, that international civil litigation is an area or field of law of what Michael 3. Particularly because many teachers, students, and practitioners using International Civil Litigation for the first time may be unfamiliar with much of the vast literature cited by the authors, a bibliography, organized by topic, would be useful. I would also recommend that the next edition include a table of cases.
Moore calls a "nominal kind,"6 one that "can . . be justified by the heuristic needs of the legal profession."7 I am interested in the ques tion whether it is, as the authors seem to claim, more than that, and in particular whether it is a field or area of "a functional kind. "8 Does that which the authors call international civil litigation seek, in Moore's words, "to realize some underlying kind of justice,"9 and if not, should it do so? Ultimately, my hope is to shed light on that which is, and that which could be, of special interest from the perspec tive of legal development, including both the applicable legal rules and the appropriate sources of the rules, whatever their content.
II. Is THERE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS?10
The themes that the authors identify as recurring in international civil litigation (pp. 3-18) are an amalgam of norms (public interna tional law, international comity), structural concerns (international re lations, federalism), and methodology (interest-balancing). Viewing international relations as a subset of separation of powers, neither the structural concerns nor the methodology is unique to international cases, and the norms have domestic analogs. Indeed, our domestic constitutional law of personal jurisdiction (full faith and credit and due process) was shaped by, or at least explained in terms borrowed from, intemational law. been responsive to international as well as domestic influences and, to that extent at least, international litigation has not been a discrete field.
Nor am I persuaded that international civil litigation is a discrete field today. It seems more accurate to view international civil litiga tion as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which (1) doctrine and techniques developed in the context of domestic cases are brought to bear on problems presented in international litigation, and (2) the in creasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domes tic cases.
A. Domestic to In ternational
As one example of a problem in international civil litigation on which our courts have brought to bear doctrine and techniques devel oped in domestic cases, 14 consider legislative, or as it is sometimes called, prescriptive jurisdiction (pp. 432-88). For one fresh to the study of international litigation from domestic law, the concept of "the authority of a state to make its substantive laws applicable to conduct, relationships or status" (p. 432) may be difficult to grasp. Our ten dency to frame issues of lawmaking power in terms of individual rights pushes into the background concerns about sovereign prerogatives that inform the concept of legislative jurisdiction and place it at the crossroads of public and private international law.
In mining domestic analogs, vertical (federal-state) thinking con jures up questions about the extent of federal legislative power, poten tial or exercised, as against the powers of the states. Yet, meaningful limitations on Congress' potential legislative powers are hard to find today. Is Moreover, domestic questions about the extent of exercised federal legislative power tend to be submerged in careless talk about subject matter jurisdiction, in part reflecting our constitutional his tory, 16 that invites confusion as between legislative and judicial pow-14. That the doctrine and techniques have been developed in domestic cases does not mean that they originated here, as the history recounted here demonstrates. Rather, we see a process in which confl icts doctrine and techniques imported from abroad and refi ned and applied in domestic cases, are then applied in international cases, with additional domestic refinements sim ilarly extending their influence. REv. 1976 REv. , 1979 REv. (1982 ("the idea of 'subject matter jurisdic tion' is a misplaced relic from the constitutional battles of the 1920's and 1930's"); Comment, Sherman Act "Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1983) . To their credit, the authors are alert to such confusion. See p. 404 . 1lfichigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1456 ers. 1 7 Confusion on that score is also promoted by the Supreme Court's approach to fi lling federal legislative gaps with judge-made law. 1 8
Horizontal (state-state) thinking is not likely to be much more helpful in a search for domestic guidance on the problem of legislative jurisdiction in international cases, although the analogy is closer. Conflicts students know that state legislatures rarely address questions of power by providing choice of law rules or otherwise indicating the intended reach of the norms they establish.1 9 They also know or should know that, when framed in terms of legislative intent, interest analysis is usually an exercise in fi ction. 20 The result has been that the closest thing to legislative jurisdiction upon which such students can fasten are domestic constitutional limitations on the application of state law. Here too, the search for meaningful limitations is largely an exercise in history. 2 1 Still, approaching the problem of legislative jurisdiction in interna tional cases from a domestic perspective has some value. Once atten tion is focused on the appropriate analogs, it becomes clear that the uniform tendency of our domestic law has been toward the loosening of mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power, federal and (inter-) state, with the result that meaningful limitations at both levels are the result of self-restraint. In that process, courts have played a prominent role, if only by default.
The same has been true, I believe, in international cases in our courts when the question has been whether there is legislative jurisdic-17. Professor Brilmayer observes "that [because of the 'public law taboo') in those cases where the Restatement of Fo reign Rela tions Law (but not the Restatement of Conflicts) applies, lack of legislative jurisdiction entails lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Brilmayer, Th e Ex tra territorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (No. 3), 11, 13 (1987) (footnote omitted). She adds: "In a case brought in fe deral court, adjudicative jurisdiction will typically depend upon whether there is a federal ques tion, which in tum depends on whether there is local legislative jurisdiction. If fo reign law gov erns, the case must be dismissed." !d. This is not helpful. See, e. g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946) ("where the complaint ... is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must entertain the suit").
18. See Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Fa ith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 755-62 (1986) . As pointed out there, the Court too often has "leap[ed) from a conclusion of fe deral power to one of judicial power," id. at 758 (footnote omitted), and, although in recent years it has been more reluctant to apply uniform fe deral rules in preference to state law adopted as fe deral law, the Court has treated the matter as one of "j udicial grace or borrowing," id. at 762, when in fact the process is governed by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988 25. In a reference usually omitted in editions of the American Banana case fo r antitrust or international law purposes, Justice Holmes continues "This principle was carried to an ex treme in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878)." In that case, as all students of American conflict of laws cases will remember, a Massachusetts lady was deprived of the defense of a Massachusetts rule prohibiting married women from guaranteeing their husbands' debts, on the ground that her guarantee had been mailed from Massachusetts to Maine and had only there become effective upon receipt by the lender and execution of the contract that gave rise to the debt. Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 435 n. (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and fo reseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the reg ulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regu lating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
[VoL 89:1456 bear on the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction the full panoply of techniques, from the consideration of contacts30 to the evaluation of interests, 3 1 that have been used to dissolve and resolve domestic choice of law problems.32 Not surprisingly, those provisions have been the object of many of the same criticisms with which modem choice of law approaches are taxed, including unmanageability and unpredict ability, lack of institutional capacity and expertise, and parochial bias. 33 Just as domestic rules of constitutional law today provide few checks on federal legislative power vis-a-vis the states or on state legis lative power vis-a-vis other states, 34 so do rules of international law (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f ) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. (3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987). Section 402 provides:
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory; (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests. !d. at § 402. Both sections are discussed at pp. 459-65.
For illustration of the principles set forth in § § 402-03 in specific substantive contexts, see § § 41 1-13 (tax); § 414 (foreign subsidiaries); § 415 (antitrust); and § 416 (securities regulation 34. The extent to which the Constitution protects foreigners in our courts is a subject that may warrant additional attention from the authors in the next edition. They note that the Court has "assumed that the due process clause [is) fully applicable to the assertion of [personal] juris diction over foreigners .... " P. 67. But constitutional limitations may be relevant to other topics treated in International Civil Litiga tion, including legislative jurisdiction. See Brilmayer, only weakly constrain extraterritorial assertions of legislative jurisdic tion. Indeed, Congress can constitutionally disregard rules of interna tional law in passing legislation for application to conduct or transactions with contacts outside of the United States (p. 443), and there is no international tribunal empowered to check its excesses. 35 As a result, the problems of authority in the domestic and interna tional contexts are alike primarily because, and to the extent that, Congress fails to specify the territorial reach of federal legislation.
For a time, traditional territorial conflicts rules and twin presump tions against extraterritorial application and interpretations that would violate international law (p. 434)-American Banana may re flect all three36-operated to put the brakes on extraterritorial appli cations of U.S. law. But, as we have seen, domestic conflicts thinking changed, and the presumption against extraterritorial application may be hard to justify in connection with statutes explicitly directed to "foreign commerce."37 Today such a presumption is difficult to justify at all,38 which may be one reason why so much effort has been devoted to invigorating its twin presumption. The focus of the effort has been to establish that the jurisdictional "rule of reason" of section 403 (pp. 459-65) is a rule of customary international law.
When, as is usually the case, Congress has failed to specify whether or to what extent a statute applies to conduct or transactions having extraterritorial links, it falls to the courts to "interpret" the statute. Left to their own devices, U.S. courts predictably, but not invariably (pp. 462-63), choose an interpretation of the statute that advances its policies over one that frustrates those policies or subordinates them to the policies of another country. The devices that lead to such behavior are not confined to knee-jerk parochialism. Brainerd Currie's interest analysis proceeded on the premise that courts in a democratic society supra note 17, at 24 465-68 ( 1989) . The "principle of reasonableness" in the exercise of legislative jurisdiction is said to be "a rule of international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 comment a (1987) . No such statement is made in connec tion with § 403(3), involving conflicting exercises of jurisdiction, the result of disagreement on the point among members of the Institute. See Kessedjian, supra, at 62 n. 104; Maier, supra, at 468.
45. This is a rule of legislative construction whose purpose is to ensure that courts do not accidentally, by exercising the judicial power, put the United States in violation of its inter national obligations when that result was not intended by the political branches. Under this rule of construction, however, the court's search of international authorities is carried out to serve the domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers, not to give effect to substantive international community policy for its own sake. Maier, supra note 44, at 454-55 n.12; see id. at 466. any different from many approaches in the conflict of laws context" (p. 462). I have suggested a negative answer to that question, one that ultimately turns on the role and content of international law in this context. That the techniques should be so similar is no surprise given the provenance of section 403, and both the similarities and the lineage are evidence against the notion that legislative jurisdiction in interna tional cases is part of a discrete fi eld. At the same time, however, the similarities should not obscure the distinctive attributes of interna tional cases that may call for special deference to choices made, or that might be made, by the political branches.
See

B. International to Domestic
To the extent that international cases in our courts raise questions of procedure, it would be surprising if they were treated differently than domestic cases. For the tendency of the modern federal law of procedure, whether created in court rules or in cases, has been toward uniform, transsubstantive rules that apply to all cases in all federal courts. 5 6 To be sure, today the rules are often only formally uniform and transsubstantive, and the whole notion is, as a normative matter, increasingly subject to attack. 57 But the pull toward applying the same rule to different substantive contexts has been so strong that sub stantive concerns originally animating a rule are forgotten, 58 and at tempts to carve out an exception in a particular substantive context are vigorously resisted. 59. See, e. g. , Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 26 8-69 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (imputing to the Court a special summary judgment rule in libel cases); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) ("We ... reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis"); see also infra text accompanying note 223 (presumption mestic examples involve rules that are "procedural" only if that label is expansively applied, including constitutional rules regarding the limits of state court jurisdiction. 60 Those rules have also provided an opportunity for generalization to operate between international and domestic cases. But they are not the only examples of cross-fertiliza tion from international to domestic cases, of adjusting the rules of the game for a larger playing field rather than playing by different rules.
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
The authors of In ternational Civil Litigation treat judicial jurisdic tion exhaustively, perhaps too much so.61 Most undergraduate law students will have covered the territory thoroughly in their first year. For them, the important thing is to see how, if at all, the involvement of foreign parties changes the analysis.62 Graduate law students and practicing lawyers may be differently situated; however, the authors provide a good· deal of textual introduction, which can be supple mented by lecture for students and by other texts for lawyers.
The authors' textual material, although typically helpful and thor ough, might be improved in two respects. First, the discussion of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should note potential distinc tions between standards of amenability Gurisdiction) when service can be made within the state, and there may therefore be scope for a fed eral standard in federal question cases, and when it must be made outside the state under Rule 4(e).63 Second, the authors may give in sufficient attention to the intense debate about the respective roles of territoriality or federalism on the one hand, and of reasonableness on the other, in constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction.64 that a subsequently enacted federal statute does not displace the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
60. See supra notes 58-59. 61. Chapter 2, treating judicial jurisdiction, occupies I 00 pages (pp. 19-118) in a boo k that, absent appendices, etc., is 646 pages long. Apart from the considerations mentioned in the text, experience indicates that, for a two-hour, one-term course, that is too much.
62. Even though most law students and litigators are likely to be familiar with Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) , the attention the authors devote to in rem and quasi in rem juris diction (pp. 90-103) is wholly appropriate because of the importance of securing property to satisfy a judgment. The authors were also wise in treating in some detail jurisdiction based on corporate affiliations or agency (pp. I 04 -17), a subject that may be neglected in domestic proce dure courses. Indeed, those materials provide an excellent opportunity to explore an important question in jurisdictional jurisprudence, to wit, the extent to which a fi rm should be able to structure its business so as to insulate itself from suit. This question is of particular importance in the international context, where the constellation of laws and practices that an assertion of jurisdiction may entail can raise the stakes dramatically. Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion in 64. Pp. 48-49, 54 -55. Perhaps as a result, the authors seem inappropriately agnostic on the This debate has been directly fueled by Supreme Court opinions that sound now one theme and then the other, and it will surely continue to rage in the wake of the Burnham case, 65 upholding general jurisdiction based on the transitory presence of the defendant when served with process in the forum (pp. 35-42). It is, of course, a debate to which undergraduate law students at any good school will have been exposed in other courses. Yet, an international perspective may help to illumi nate it. 66 More important for present purposes, attention to the debate and to the cases that have fueled it calls into question the authors' claim that the Court's 1987 decision in the Asahi case67 represented a "modif[ication of] domestic due process formulations in international cases" (p. 56), if by that claim they mean that different "due process formulations" are now applied in international and domestic cases.
The holding in Asahi, where the Court denied California's power to adjudicate an indemnity claim by a defendant against one of its component part manufacturers, will probably have limited significance because of its unusual facts, in particular the facts that the party in voking the court's jurisdiction was a Taiwanese corporation, that the claim involved was probably governed by foreign law, and that the putative party resisting jurisdiction was also a foreign corporation. 68 But the mode of constitutional analysis used to reach that holding was not intended to be, and has not been, restricted to international cases.
Beginning in 1977, when after a twenty-year hiatus the Court again became interested in federal constitutional control of state court question whether, when a national amenability standard is prescribed or authorized, reasonable ness plays a part in the fifth amendment analysis. See p. 77. But see Carrington, Continuing Wo rk on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. i33, i42 (1988) ("It seems also likely that the fifth amendment prevents a fomm selection that is so unreasonably inconve nient to the defendant as to be a denial of 'fair play and substantial justice.' ") (footnote omitted).
One should distinguish between international law and the Constitution in deciding whether it makes a difference where in this country an internationally foreign defendant is sued. But see jurisdiction, 6 9 Justice Brennan had been trying to broaden the due pro cess inquiry so that the attention paid to defendants did not pretermit consideration of the interests of plaintiffs or of the forums in which they sued. 7 0 Although the majorities in those cases paid lip service to the factors stressed by Brennan,71 in fact they decided the cases on the basis of an inquiry into the contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. 72 As a result, the Court seemed unlikely to reverse an exercise of jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly viewed) were found to exist or, conversely, to sustain an exercise of jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly viewed) were lack ing. 73 Moreover, the Court's cases provided little basis for formulat ing a sliding scale of minimum contacts. 74
Against this background, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 75 gave Justice Brennan an opportunity to write his views into an opinion for the Court, if not yet into law. Although that opinion acknowledged that "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State,"76 it went on to state that "these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdic tion would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' "77 More over, the Court's opinion asserted that the same factors "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser show ing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."78
Asahi made law out of Burger King's dicta, but the law made was hard to discern. Given his conclu s ion that there were minimum con tacts in Asahi, Justice Brennan (joined by three others) thought that " [t] his is one of those rare cases in which 'minimum requirements in- herent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" .. . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has pur posefully engaged in forum activities.' "79 But three members of the Court (including two who also joined Justice Brennan's opinion), led by Justice Stevens, expressed the view that "[a]n examination of mini mum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional. "80 More over, that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion that commanded a ma jority deployed a multifactored analysis in which the place of minimum contacts was not at all clear.81
The worries arising from this cacophony were, at least for me, that (1) state (and federal) courts would discard minimum contacts analy sis altogether, and (2) they would regard Asahi as an invitation to as sert jurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts (narrowly viewed). Neither development would, in my opinion, have been desir able. Minimum contacts is hardly a talisman, but, as developed and refined in recent years, the test has imparted some measure of predict ability to an area of law where it is very important (p. 56). Moreover, the requirement of minimum contacts has served as a bulwark against states seeking not just to adjudicate but to apply forum law.8 2 Hap pily, the lower courts have not regarded Asahi as an invitation to aban don minimum contacts, but they have recognized that it is authority to consider something more. 83
Asahi was an international case, and its international dimensions 79. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78).
80. 480 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]his case fits within the rule that 'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.' " (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78)).
81. See 480 U.S. at 113-16. The only reference to minimum contacts in Part II.B of Justice O'Connor's opinion, which was joined by all members of the Court except Justice Scalia, occurs in a sentence asserting that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the fo rum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant." 480 U.S. at 114. It is likely, however, that references to other decisions giving primacy to minimum contacts, see 480 U.S. at 112-13, refl ect the belief that it remains "the constitutional touchstone." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. See infra note 86.
82. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 325 n.8 (1980) . The costs of a free-form due process inquiry would not be confined to litigants. The Supreme Court would be called on to clean up the mess it had created. When it did so, I expect we would find a majority of the Court reasserting the primacy of minimum contacts analysis and making it clear that multifactored analysis is a one-way street, available to strike down an exercise of jurisdiction where the mini mum contacts inquiry is indeterminate but not to bless jurisdiction where minimum contacts (narrowly viewed) are lacking. This seems to have been Justice Stevens' position in Asahi. See supra note 80. If not, the Court would soon find it necessary to revisit the question of federal constitutional control of state choice of law. Cf Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 97-98 (1978) (if fo rum law -then jurisdiction preference would require more adequate policing of choice of law).
83. See, e.g. , cases cited infr a note 87.
properly influenced the outcome. 84 But the case provided a vehicle fo r the reascension of a mode of constitutional analysis that had been re pudiated in deeds if not in words. 8 5 The "modification" it initiated is not one that-judging from the opinions86-the Justices embracing it intended fo r application only in international cases, and it has not been so restricted in the lower courts in the years since the case was decided. 87
Arbitration
The perceived pressures of their dockets sooner or later would have caused the federal courts to reexamine rules that sought to pro tect their jurisdiction fr om efforts either to avoid judicial dispute reso lution or to ensure that, if it was necessary, litigation proceed in a fo rum or fo rums agreed to in advance. In the case of agreements to arbitrate (pp. 605-46), Congress long ago set itself against the tradi tional judicial hostility. The potential of the Federal Arbitration Act88 to override that hostility, however -particularly in state courts and state law cases in federal court -was not quickly realized. 89 More- We have previOusly explained that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintitrs interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fu ndamental substantive social policies." Wo rld Wide Vo lkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted). over, even in cases to which the Act was unquestionably applicable, the federal courts carved out exceptions in particular substantive contexts. 90 International cases furnished occasions to reconsider the excep tions to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,9 1 and in those cases the Court placed weight on "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for pre dictability in the resolution of disputes."92 The authors of In terna tional Civil Litigation observe:
After Mitsubishi, the characterization of a contract as "international," rather than domestic, may be of importance in determining the arbi trability of at least some types of statutory claims, although recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate a readiness to enforce most arbitra tion agreements, even in the purely domestic context . . . . [p. 630] In fact, the McMahon case,93 cited by the authors, suggests that inter national elements no longer have much salience when the question is arbitration, and I wonder whether they ever really did.94 We see the same progression -indeed, the one influenced the other -in cases involving the enforceability of contractual forum selection clauses (pp. 172-208), with an international case, Th e Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 95 providing a vehicle for a change in the law that has been ex tended to domestic cases (p. 177).
International cases in our courts may present occasions for the ap plication of rules of law that are not pertinent in wholly domestic cases. Act of state9 6 and foreign sovereign immunity (pp. 335-402) are two prominent examples. Yet, as the authors of In ternational Civil Litigation recognize, even in these areas the rules have not been im mune to domestic infiuences. 97 In any event, a few pockets of doctrine do not make a field of "a functional kind, "98 although their existence enhances the value of materials designed to serve the needs of the legal profession.
III. SHOULD THERE BE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS?
All of this begs the normative questions whether, apart from what the courts and the American Law Institute have done or are doing, international civil litigation should be a field and what it should con tain. As I have already suggested,99 the answers to those questions may depend on the part that international law can and should usefully If, as is usual, the act of state doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating a claim brought by a plaintiff, it may be appropriate to label the doctrine one of judicial abstention, although even then, one should attend to the nature and fo rm of the judgment entered, as well as to its preclu sive consequences. But, as the authors well know, the doctrine also operates to defeat defenses, and in that context abstention hardly seems an adequate description. See Sa bbatino, 376 U.S. at 438 (reprinted at p. 501).
The authors' reading of Sa bbatino as reflecting "a more flexible doctrine of abstention, appar ently calling fo r case-by-case consideration of a variety of fa ctors" (p. 49 1) is supported by a quotation wrenched from context. In any event, that reading seems to confuse reasoning with holding. See pp. 503, 505.
What the materials do well is provide a sense of the evolution of the doctrine and of the problem of fitting it to the needs of an age in which territoriality has lost much, but by no means all, of its holding power. The authors' apparent preference for a fu nctional approach is certainly understandable. It is not, however, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in its latest opin ion on the subject. Foreign sovereign immunity is an area where domestic analogs are obvious, and some of them have been incorporated in fe deral legislation that, since 1976, has controlled in the area. See, e.g., P!J· 387-97 (discretionary fu nctions exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(5)(A) (1988) drawn from Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1988) ). Yet, it should not be assumed that the doctrines of fo reign sovereign immunity and of sovereign immunity have common parentage, although today they appear to be shaped and justified by common rationales. play, for it is in international law that one would expect to find an attempt "to realize some underlying kind of justice. " 1 00 Perhaps, that is, international civil litigation should be a subfield within public inter national law. If so, In ternational Civil Litigation, quite uncharacteris tically, does not offer much help. 101 The authors may have assumed that teachers and students would already be versed in public interna tional law. Alternatively and more likely, they may simply have yielded to a sense of practical limits on what a course can cover, rely ing on their readers' initiative to overcome ignorance in the book's exhaustive literature references. Having made that effort I will ap proach the question through attention to two topics treated at length and with sophistication in International Civil Litigation: service of process and taking evidence abroad.
I conclude that one form of international law, custom, has only a limited role to play in these areas and that most U.S. courts and com mentators, as well as law reformers, have denied to it even that poten tial. Although I see a much greater role for treaties, even here the potential has not been realized, and I argue that one need not look to international law for a cure. The same disease afflicts us in interna tional as in wholly domestic cases and law reform efforts: an unwill ingness to surrender power, including by taking separation of powers seriously, both when judges are deciding cases and when they are exer cising delegated legislative power to make court rules.
A. Service of Process Abroad
Many law students learn little about service of process in their law school procedure courses, where notwithstanding-or maybe because of -Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "service" is likely to be subordinated in discussion to the problem of jurisdic tion.1 02 Litigators, of course, must learn the mechanics of service, but as the authors point out (p. 120), what they learn in domestic cases may ill equip them for the intricacies of international cases. Those intricacies consequentially increase two risks associated with service of process: (1) that effective service cannot be made within the time re quired by an applicable statute of limitations, and (2) that whatever service is made will be deemed ineffective when the time comes to en- force a domestic judgment abroad. The intricacies of service in inter national cases also increase its value to those who regard litigation as a war of attrition. The authors pay little attention to the fi rst risk (p. 148), perhaps because of their emphasis on service in federal actions and the recent transmogrifi cation of Rule 3 into a uniform tolling rule in federal question cases. 103 They are, however, alert to problems of expense and delay and to the risk that the temptation to mitigate them may lead to the use of means of service unacceptable to a foreign court in the enforcement context. 1 04
What is missing here is a framework to ground both an under standing of the reasons why service of process continues to cause so many problems in international cases and an understanding of ap proaches, whether in domestic or international law, that have promise to resolve those problems. For these purposes, domestic learning may not be simply inadequate; it may impede proper understanding.
Developments in the domestic law of service of process, spurred by the needs of a highly mobile society and by the evolving jurisprudence of federal constitutional controls on state court jurisdiction, have led us to conceive of the function performed by process in terms of the interests of the defendant in adequate notice and opportunity to de fend. 105 We have lost sight of the historic function of asserting the state's power, indeed to such an extent that the Supreme Court's re cent decision in the Burnham case, 1 06 arguably reflecting that historic function and little more, may seem incoherent. 107 Concern for ex- 104. Counsel must carefully consider the advantages and risks of different service mecha nisms and select the mode of service (or combination thereof) best suited to the client's case. This requires weighing the relative importance in particular cases of the often conflicting goals of minimizing costs, ensuring fo reign enforceability of any U.S. judgment, and accom plishing service promptly. P. 127.
105. Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de fa cto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other fo rm of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the fo rum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 2105 (1990) (upholding general jurisdic tion based on transitory presence of defendant in fo rum).
I 07. "The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fa ir play and substantial justice.' " Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 21 15. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment is no more
pense has led us further away from involvement of the state in the process, 108 and impatience with what is seen as the strategic insistence on formalities knows no international boundaries. 10 9
Not all countries share the American view of the limited role of service of process (p. 131 ). Nor should this be surprising when one recalls that elsewhere active involvement of the state (through the judge) may reflect a normative view of litigation that is deeper than a perceived caseload crisis, 110 that elsewhere a "foreign" defendant usu ally means one affiliated with another nation-state (and not one whose courts are bound by the full faith and credit clause or an equivalent), and that elsewhere people may not yet have come to regard litigation as a fact, however unpleasant, of everyday life.1 11
The authors of In ternational Civil Litigation note that, even in the recent past, service of process abroad in connection with U.S. civil litigation has evoked diplomatic protests (p. 129). Moreover, although the materials might suggest that the problem has been confined to the context of administrative subpoenas and implicates only the question of "enforcement jurisdiction" (pp. 128-3 1), the authors provide hints that such is not the case (p. 125) and question any distinction between "notice" and "compulsion" (p. 131 ). They do not provide, however, sufficient information or perspective for evaluating the "[m]ajority view of [the] effect on U.S. proceedings of service abroad in violation of foreign law" (p. 128), which is that the violation is not grounds to quash. The chapter would be well served by a section, necessarily gen eral and comparative, that explores the service rules of foreign states and the implications of customary international law.1 1 2
See infra
As the authors implicitly recognize, the best strategy to resolve the conflicts undoubtedly consists in international service conventions, two of which are included in appendices to the book (pp. 651 -84), and one of which, the Hague Service Convention, is explored in detail (pp. 136-60). Such conventions are a substitute for our full faith and credit clause, mooting both choice of law and customary international law questions (which may not be independent) that can arise with respect to service. They are not, of course, a perfect substitute. As the materi als in In ternational Civil Litigation make clear, problems of interpreta tion remain, about which there can be a difference of opinion within one signatory state (pp. 156-60). Differences of opinion are more likely between signatory states, because mutually agreed upon lan guage masks fundamental assumptions about law and society that may not derive from a shared tradition, 11 3 and no tribunal can impose a uniform interpretation. But, as the materials also suggest (p. 142 n. 97), not every conflicting interpretation requires litigation, and the framework for dialogue that an international convention establishes perhaps its most enduring contribution -may help to resolve con flicts that stem not so much from ambiguous language as from differ ences · in those fundamental assumptions.
Interpretation and discussion, two forms of dialogue, do not ex haust the opportunities for accommodation either when a subject is explicitly covered by an international convention or when it is not. The conventions themselves inevitably present questions as to the scope of their coverage, and even when their specific provisions are not strictly applicable, they may still bear on the solution to the problem. Domestic law may not be clear; customary international law often is not. A convention may light the way to bringing the former in line In the Sch lunk case, 11 5 the Supreme Court held that, although the Hague Service Convention is mandatory when service of process must be effected abroad in another signatory state, the internal law of the fo rum (state or fe deral) alone determines whether in fa ct service must be made abroad in order to be effective. Rejecting the view of three concurring Justices that the Convention itself imposes a check on in ternal fo rum law,1 16 the Court expressed doubt "that this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to cir cumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents fo r service abroad." 1 1 7 The Court also fo und comfort in due process protection of foreign nationals and noted practical considerations that are likely to prompt resort to the Con vention even when it is not mandatory. 1 18
What the Court in Sch lunk fa iled to appreciate, and what the con curring Justices imperfectly articulated, is that the Hague Service Convention, as (self-executing) fe deral law supreme under the Consti tution, 119 is deserving of no less respect than a fe deral statute. 120 It thus requires interpretation sympathetic to the language, history, and goals of the lawmaking enterprise, 1 21 and laws which are not of equal (1989) . That may be a small point at which to stick. Historical research by Jerome Marcus demonstrates that, in the early years of this country, the Senate had, or had access to, the negotiating records of treaties. Marcus argues that senators could have such access today and that recognition of a duty to review the negotiating record before advising and con senting is preferable to the position taken in the Biden condition, a position that invites dishonor of our international obligations. Indeed, the Biden condition may be deemed inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, insofar as treaties were included to ensure that we honor those obliga tions. See J. Marcus, Some Historical Evidence on the Treaty Interpretation Debate (unpub lished manuscript) (copy on file with author). dignity, state122 or federal,123 should not be permitted to frustrate either the meaning or the goals so identifi ed. Whether the preferred label is preemption or federal common law, 124 the idea should be clear. The supremacy of federal law requires protection as much from eva sion and distortion as it does from overt conflict, and the Constitution is not the only federal law to be protected. 12 5 That, indeed, is the message of the Rules of Decision Act, 126 which, we may forget, con templates displacement of the "laws of the several states" not only by "the Constitution" and "Acts of Congress," but also by "treaties of the United States," and not only when those sources so "provide," but when they so "require." Of course, care must be taken both to ensure that state law is not displaced lightly and that judges do not overstep their proper roles. The latter concern explains the judicial preference for the preemption label, 127 but neither concern is unique to the international context. In deed, federalism concerns seem diminished in that context, because in matters implicating this nation's foreign policy and foreign commerce, the states act, if at all, only by federal sufferance.128 Treaties may present a discrete set of concerns for preemption or federal common law analysis from the perspective of separation of powers.129 Whatever their status in domestic law, treaties partake of the nature of contracts. Although there need not be a quid pro quo or consideration, typically there is. 1 30 If a court were to engage in a give away -to expand the scope of a treaty beyond that contemplated by the treatymakers or to require the displacement of laws (state or fed eral) not reasonably deemed inconsistent with it -that action could compromise the ability of those primarily charged with the conduct of foreign relations effectively to implement our national interests through dialogue with other nations. 131 This concern is not, however, an excuse for abdication, particularly given the language of the Rules of Decision Act and the reasons for including treaties in that statute and in article Vl.132 Rather, courts should take special care in deter mining what treaties "provide" and what they "require." If, contrary to the Court's assurance in Schlunk, a state (versus "this country") were to "draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention,"133 there is both the power and the duty in the courts, federal and state, to displace those laws.
Schlunk involved state law on service of process and law that, all the Justices agreed, 134 was not fairly deemed hostile to or inconsistent with the Hague Service Convention. When fe deral law is in direct conflict with, or otherwise derogates from the obligations of, a treaty, a different analysis applies. Subject to the mediating influences of judi cial interpretation, a subsequently enacted federal statute controls. 13 5 Conversely, judge-made federal law is constrained by, and must be 129. For some this is not a difficulty peculiar to treaties. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 540-44 (1983) (statutes as compromises).
130. See L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 142-43; Oxman, supra note 35, at 760-6 1.
131. Cf Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1990) (re jecting argument that United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement preempts state law and not ing that such an interpretation would be anomalous in light of Congress' "concern with achieving rec i procal trade barrier reduction"); supra text accompanying note 54 (potential of judicial restraint in interpreting extraterritorial application of domestic legislation to undercut Executive).
132. See supra note 119. Today, the costs of dishonoring our treaty obligations may not be as obvious as they were in the late eighteenth century. See Holt, supra note 119. They are nonethe less to be reckoned with. For example, although aliens are protected by due process and thus insulated to a very great extent fr om evasions of the Hague Service Convention, similar domestic Jaw protections may not be available to our nationals when sued in the courts of other signatory states that fo llow the interpretation of the Convention given in Schlunk. Notwithstanding more than fi fty years of cases and scholarly com mentary to the contrary, the primary concern of those responsible for drafting the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 138 was fi nding appropriate limits for the allocation of federal lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress. The procedure/substance dichotomy in the 1934 Act139 was thus designed to serve separation of powers values and only incidentally and derivatively to protect feder alism values. It was designed to preserve for Congress certain pro spective lawmaking choices and only incidentally and derivatively to protect lawmaking choices, federal or state, already made. 140
Congress pulled together and amended the various statutory grants of supervisory rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in 1988. 1 41 Although most attention to the legislation has focused on an unsuc cessful attempt to repeal the so-called supersession clause, pursuant to which Federal Rules trump previously enacted statutes with which they are in conflict, 142 the legislative history reveals a determined ef fort to bring the rulemakers closer to the original understanding. 143
Whether under the original Enabling Act or its most recently amended successor, Federal Rules relating to the manner of service do not usually present problems of validity. Indeed, for precisely that reason, the Supreme Court has twice used Rule 4 to extend the influ ence of the Rules into areas where they could not have infl uence di- rectly, both times involving limitations law, once in a diversity case144 and once in a federal question case.14 5
Service of process abroad is not the usual case, or at least it was not when Rule 4(i)14 6 was added to the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963. The amendment was part of a comprehensive package of pro posals developed by, or in close consultation with, the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which led not only to changes in the Federal Rules but to federal legislation and a Uniform Act. 1 47 The academics chiefly responsible for the work of the Com mission 148 were impatient with foreign claims that service of process is an official act and that unilateral service abroad abridges territorial sovereignty, and even with objections to service made in violation of local law.149 In opting for a program of unilateral American reform, these individuals were following, while attempting to justify, 15 0 the time-honored American course of "leading" by example as a prelude, if not in preference, to attempting to reach mutual understanding. 1 51 When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule autho rizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or fo und within the state in which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a fo reign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the fo reign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the fo reign authority in response to a letter roga tory, when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon an individual, by delivery to the individual personally, and upon a corporation or partner ship or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any fo rm of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or (E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age or who is designated by order of the district court or by the fo reign court. On request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff fo r transmission to the person or the fo reign court or officer who will make the service. (2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this rule, or by the law of the fo reign country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to subparagraph (1 )(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. FED. R. Clv. P. 4(i). 151. Co mpare Jones, supra note 128, at 517, 556-62 (noting history of "j udicial isolationism," often dressed up in fe deralism excuses, and need for dialogue) with Smit, supra note 147, at-1016 (unilateral domestic reform undertaken "on the view that internal reforms could obviate the need fo r international regulation, but also on the notion that regulation by treaty might invade areas Framed so as "to allow accommodation to the policies and proce dures of the foreign country,"1 52 Rule 4(i) nonetheless contemplates service abroad that is valid "even if [made in a manner] forbidden by the foreign country in which it was made. "1 53 Although the Reporter thought that would be "an unhappy result," 1 54 the problem was deemed primarily one of recognition of judgments.1 55 Yet, as was pointed out at the time, "[p ]roblems of service of process raise ques tions of sovereignty in many foreign countries. They cannot be solved unilaterally with disregard of the views of the local sovereign. Those who speak of 'tenderness to the sensibilities of foreign nations' . . . should study the long list of diplomatic incidents. "1 56
Whether or not Rule 4(i) permits service in violation of customary international law, it treats a matter that, in 1963 and today, implicates the foreign policy and foreign trade interests of the United States. The responsibility for such interests lies with the Executive and Con gress. 15 7 Federal Rules do not require the approval of Congress (but see pp. 124, 129, 33 1), and even if the report and wait requirement of the Enabling Act could theoretically or practically be equated with approval, 158 the process by which Federal Rules become effective does not involve the President. The rulemakers have no expertise in inter national law, and even if they did, they have no business making pol icy choices in an area of international sensitivity, whether or not the policy choices actually made are consistent with customary intematraditionally covered by state law and thus was a subject to be approached with caution"). Smit thus proved Jones a poor prophet. See Jones, supra note 128, at 562 ("It is doubtful that it would be argued today that the benefits of procedural reform must be denied the state courts in the international field, where the states themselves are powerless to act.") (footnote omitted). 154. Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637.
155. See id. 156. Nadelmann, supra note 128, at 310-11 n.l41 (citing Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637); see also Smit, supra note 147, at 1018 ("due regard fo r the sensibilities of fo reign governments").
157. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 119. For the role of the courts, see id. at 205-24. " [W] hen the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the en terprise in which the Court, or any fed eral court, is engaged when it makes fe deral common law." Burbank, supra note 142, at 1021.
158. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988), Federal Rules must be transmitted to Congress not later than May I of the year in which they are to become effective and can take effect no earlier than December I. For a theoretical and practical critique of the view that this mechanism is the equivalent of legislation, or at least of congressional "approval," see Burbank, supra note 14(), at 1102, 1177-79, 1196 n.779. tional law. The best defense of Rule 4(i), other than the nontest of Sibbach v. Wi lson & Co. , 1 59 is that it was part of an integrated pack age, some of which was passed by Congress and signed by the Presi dent, and all of which was specifically brought to Congress' attention. 1 60
The same defense is not available for proposed amendments to Rule 4 that were published for comment in the fall of 19 8 9 1 6 1 and revised without public notice in the summer of 1990, 1 62 and that are currently pending before the Supreme Court for possible promulgation and reporting to Congress. 1 63 These proposals do not fall under the auspices of a broadly representative Commission, and they are not part of a larger, including legislative, whole. 164 Moreover, not only has this country entered into two international service conventions since 1963, 1 65 but diplomatic protests have continued. 1 66 Both con firm the sensitivity of service abroad and the inappropriateness of law making in the area at the instance of a self-described "committee of 159. 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) ("The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process fo r enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress fo r disregard or infraction of them."); see Burbank, supra note 140, at 1028-1032, 1176-81. 164. For a time it appeared that doubts about the Court's powers under the Enabling Act would lead to submission of one of the proposals, providing in Rule 4 a federal amenability standard fo r federal questions cases, fo r legislative action. See Carrington, supra note 64, at 744. This notion was abandoned in the preliminary draft put out fo r comment, although a prefatory note to the preliminary draft of amendments to Rule 4 made alternative recommendations in the event Congress "disapproved" the proposed revision or did not disapprove it. Preliminary Draft, supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 266. The author criticized the provision as beyond the Court's powers under the Enabling Act. See letter fr om Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 2-3 (Mar. 14, 1990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Burbank letter] . The proposed amendment to Rule 4 was drastically cut back, without public notice, to provide a federal amenability standard in fe deral question cases only "over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state." Proposed Amendments to the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure 20 (copy on file with author) [here inafter 17oposed Amendments]. This does not solve the problem of rulemaking power, and it raises a host of practical questions that are not answered in the Advisory Committee's Note. See id. at 39-40. A "Special Note" contemplates that Congress may disapprove the provision and recommends in any event that the rest of the rule be approved. See id. at 1. technicians." 1 6 7
One set of proposed amendments to Rule 4 involves a system for waiver of service, implemented "through first-class mail or other relia ble means" and backed up by cost-shifting if a defendant "fails to com ply with the request [for waiver] ... unless good cause for the failure be shown." The proposed waiver would not apply to objections to venue or to personal jurisdiction, but the mechanism would be avail able with respect to all defendants (other than the United States, a corporation of the United States, and infants or incompetents), wher ever they may be found. 168
In a country where "the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service or other form of notice,"169 this mechanism would make a great deal of sense, reducing incentives to impose unnecessary expense and delay. 170 Its proposed extension from domestic cases to cases where service would have to be effected abroad is, however, problematic. The Advisory Committee reasons that " [b] ecause the transmission of the waiver does not purport to effect service except by consent, the transmission of a request for consent sent to a foreign country gives no reasonable offense to foreign sovereignty, even to for eign governments that have withheld their assent to service by mail."171 This reasoning is not persuasive.
As the Advisory Committee recognizes, the proposed waiver of service mechanism is in fact a mechanism for defeasible service. With Rule 4(i) on the books, it is no surprise that this aspect gave no pause. One may question, however, whether a waiver is consensual if it was executed with the awareness that sanctions 172 would be imposed if it was refused without "good cause" according to the notions of a for eign legal system. One may also question whether, in any event, a private litigant has the power to consent to what her country regards as an abrogation of territorial sovereignty.173 Perhaps the Advisory 171. Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 30.
172. "Openly stated, the principle is kin to that underlying recent changes in Rules 11 and 16." Carrington, supra note 64, at 736 (footnote omitted); see id. at 737 (noting that "costs of formal service ... can be substantial"); infra note 183.
173. "Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected." Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n. IO (1982) . If Switzerland regards return receipt mail service as a violation of article 27 1 of the Swiss Penal Code, "which prohibits anyone from committing an act in Switzerland on behalf of a fo reign country 'that is a matter of authority' without first obtaining the permission of the Swiss government," Miller, supra note 110, at 1077; see id. at !080 n.20, 1111, is it likely to take a different view of "a Committee is correct as a matter of customary international law, but consideration of such questions suggests that both the Committee's premise and its conclusion are debatable, especially if we imagine a defendant who does not understand English. 1 74 We know that the rulemakers have misjudged "foreign sensibilities" 1 75 in the past and that judgments about "reasonable offense" are culturally contin gent. 1 7 6 Apart from existing service conventions, these judgments should be made by Congress with participation by the President. Moreover, the existence of service conventions not only suggests the inappropriateness of the subject for court rulemaking, it raises a dis crete and very troublesome question of rulemaking power. One of the benefi ts of treaties, as we have seen, is that they can moot questions of choice of law and of customary international law.177 Does the En abling Act vest the Supreme Court with the power to override a treaty in court rules?
Some countries adhering to the Hague Service Convention do not permit service by mail (pp. 155-60, 655-69). Indeed, whether a failure to make a reservation with respect to article 10(a)178 of the Convention In comments on the proposed waiver of service mechanism, one of the authors of Interna tional Civil Litiga tion predicted that "some civil law nations will object, perhaps vigorously, to the waiver mechanism." Statement of Gary B. Born before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 2, 1990, at 24 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Born State ment). He noted that some countries forbid "purely consensual, noncoercive fo reign discovery (e.g., depositions) on their territory, except under the supervision of their authorities," id. at 25 (footnote omitted), and that they would likely also regard waivers "as violations of local judicial sovereignty." /d. ; cf. Oxman, supra note 35, at 740 n. !6, 781 n. 134 (private party may not waive rights of a fo reign state).
174. There is no requirement that the documents sent abroad be translated, but "[i]t would ... be sufficient cause not to shift the cost of service if the defendant did not receive the request or was insufficiently literate in English to understand it." Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 30. See infr a notes 182-83. 177. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. Professor Smit argued that [t]he absence of an interest worthy of protection is demonstrated most clearly by the willing ness of the very same nations that object to the performance of fo reign procedural acts within their borders in the absence of a treaty to permit such acts as soon as they are cov ered by an international agreement. Smit, supra note 147, at 1018 (footnote omitted). He seems to have neglected both the possibility that an "international agreement" may contain a quid pro quo, see supra text accompanying note 130, and that, even if not, it may contain conditions, requirements, and procedures sufficient to distinguish an exercise of power pursuant to its authority from a unilateral exercise of power. More fu ndamentally, Professor Smit seems to have neglected the importance of consent in inter national law. See Weisburd, supra note 114, at 45-46.
178. "Provided the State of destination does not obj ect, the present Convention shall not constitutes consent to service by mail is a matter on which U.S. courts are divided. 1 79 We know from dictum in Sch lunk that the Convention is mandatory when service must, as a matter of internal law, be ef fected abroad. 1 80 The Court also asserted that we need not worry about attempts to "draft ... internal laws deliberately so as to circum vent the Convention. " 1 8 1 Professor Carrington has assured us that the extension of the proposed waiver of service mechanism to countries that adhere to the Convention "is not intended to circumvent [it] , but to take proper account of the sensitivities of fo reign sovereigns which are properly expressed in that treaty." 1 82 Accepting his assurance, inten tions are nonetheless irrelevant if the proposal is, as it appears to be, inconsistent with the Convention.1 8 3 If it is and if it were implemented for service in signatory countries as a matter of state law, waiver of service would be invalid because "state law must yield when it is ininterfere with -(a) the fr eedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad .... " P. 652. 182. Carrington, supra note 64, at 749 n. l08 (emphasis added). He thus recognized the risk that it would be so regarded. See also id. at 737. Moreover, the use of the italicized language recalls similar arguments by Professor Carrington's predecessors. See supra text accompanying notes 156, 175.
In his comments on the proposed waiver mechanism, one of the authors of International Civil Litigation predicted "that at least some states that are party to the Hague Service Convention will view the waiver mechanism as a circumvention of the treaty," particularly because there is no translation requirement. Born Statement, supra note 173, at 25 n.33.
183. Whether or not article lO(a) includes service of process, see supra note 179 and accom panying text, an article IO(a) reservation includes objection to the sending of "j udicial docu ments, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." P. 652. Do the rulemakers contend that the proposed notice and request and/or the copy of the complaint which must accompany it are not "judicial documents"? What of the information "by means of a text prescribed in an official form promulgated pursuant to Rule 84"?
More generally, the cost-shifting mechanism in the proposed amendment may be deemed inconsistent with article 12 of the Convention, pursuant to which "[t]he applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by -(a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under the law of the state of destination, (b) the use of a particular method of service." Pp. 652-53; see I B. RISTAU, supra note 166, at 146-47.
Finally, the waiver proposal, including its cost-shifting mechanism, may be deemed inconsis tent with the provision in article 5 of the Convention that "[s]ubject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily." P. 652. Like the waiver proposal, "this method of service dispenses with the translation requirements under Article 5(a) and does not give rise to any costs." I B. RISTAU, supra 166, at 145. But unlike the waiver proposal, under article 5(a) the addressee "can decline acceptance fo r any reason, including, of course, that the document is not in a language which [she] understands," id. at 138, without fe ar of sanctions. See id. at 145 (criticizing this country's practice of disregarding requests fo r "informal delivery," thereby "denying the ad dressee the opportunity of refusing to accept the document" afforded by fo reign law). consistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty."184 If promulgated by the Supreme Court, and unless blocked by legislation, however, the proposed waiver of service mechanism would become part of federal law, and, under the Enabling Act, " [a] ll laws in conflict with [it] shall be of no further force or effect after [it] ha[s] taken effect."18 5 I will not here replay the debate about the wisdom and validity of the supersession clause.186 Suffice it to say that the prospect of a Fed eral Rule of Civil Procedure, not approved by Congress let alone by the President, abrogating or subverting a treaty obligation of this country, should give pause to even the staunchest defender of supersession. Note, moreover, that the common avoidance technique of classifying problems of supersession as problems of validity (of Federal Rules)187 will not work given existing Rule 4(i), although the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find any Federal Rule invalid reveals the technique as pure rhetoric.188 Note also that imputing a discrete procedure/sub stance dichotomy to the supersession clause, thereby preserving from its purview laws that are "arguably substantive,"1 89 will not work either, because presumably nobody thinks laws regulating the manner of service fall within that category. The Hague Service Convention may deal with matters of procedure, but they are hardly "procedural marginalia"190 of the sort that some claim are the object of the super session clause. It manifests no disrespect for the federal courts as a " 'coequal' branch[ ] of the government"191 to believe that they have no more business subverting a treaty acting in a legislative mode than they do when deciding cases or controversies. 192 The Chief Justice has asserted to Congress that the "advisory com mittees should undertake to be circumspect in superseding procedural statutes" and has assured Congress that the rulemakers "will under take to identify such situations when they arise."193 One would think that treaties called for special circumspection, including in prejudging the question of inconsistency and thus avoiding noiice to Congress.
Indeed, assuming the validity of the Enabling Act's supersession clause, and hence the equivalence of Federal Rules and statutes, the Chief Justice's promise is, with respect to treaties, a condition for su persession. Abrogation or modification of a treaty by a subsequently enacted statute requires a clear expression of congressional purpose. 194 No superseding effect can properly be given to a Federal Rule that is inconsistent with a treaty where such a purpose is not brought to the attention of Congress, let alone denied by the rulemakers.
If the proposed use abroad of the waiver of service mechanism is not a deliberate attempt "to circumvent the Convention," 195 it is diffi cult otherwise to regard another proposed amendment to Rule 4 that is part of the same package. As originally put out for comment, the provision would have permitted a district court, in a case governed by the Convention (or other treaty), to direct service in a manner con trary to the Convention if service had not been effected within six months of a request for assistance to a foreign government. 196 In com ments submitted to the Advisory Committee, one of the authors of In ternational Civil Litigation suggested that the provision might con flict with the Hague Service Convention. 197 The provision has been deleted. The proposed amendments before the Supreme Court, how ever, contain a provision that would authorize service by whatever means may be directed by the court, including service by means not authorized by international agreement or not consistent with the law of a foreign country, if the court fi nds that internationally agreed means or the law of a foreign country (A) will not provide a lawful means by which service can be effected, or (B) in cases of urgency, will not permit service within the time required by the circumstances. 1 98
The Advisory Committee Note reveals that the deletion was cos metic only, that the new provision, like the old, is intended to author ize service "by means not authorized by international agreement or not consistent with the law of a foreign country" when a Central Au thority has failed "to effect service within the six month period pro vided by the Convention." 199 The new provision fi nds no greater support for this proposition in article 15 of the Convention than did the old. 2 00 We see again impatience with delay and an assertion by technicians of the power, if not to override this country's treaty obliga tions, then to create a situation where conflict in interpretations is in evitable, all through a policy choice buried in drafting history.
B. Ta king Evidence Abroad
The materials on taking evidence abroad in In ternational Civil Liti gation (pp. 261-334) are very complete and very well organized. Moreover, here the authors independently provide more information and perspective for one interested in the comparative and international law aspects of the problem.2 o 1
The reader is alerted early to the fact that discovery abroad has "produced some of the most contentious disputes that have arisen in international civil litigation" (p. 261; see also pp. 265-66). The com parative information provided includes the insight that "[t]he compar atively restrictive scope of foreign discovery generally reflects important foreign public policies, such as protection against unreason able intrusion into personal privacy,"202 as well as the very practical explanation that the inability to recover the costs of discovery in this country, as possible in many foreign systems, "aggravates displeasure about intrusive and expensive U.S.-style discovery" (p. 265 n.22).
Although the authors refer to the possibility that unilateral extra territorial discovery may violate customary international law (pp. 265, 278) and raise questions of power to proceed in violation of foreign law (pp. 29 1-92), they do not clearly distinguish between the two. Per haps that is because the foreign diplomatic protests reported by the authors (p. 279) have not made such distinctions,2°3 and because to a considerable extent the questions merge, as for example where discov ery must be conducted under the supervision of a judge under foreign law.
Still, it would be useful to know how it is that our courts came to confined to cases involving default judgments against defendants who evade service." Born Statement, supra note 173, at 19. Article 15 seems exclusively directed toward default judgments and not to authorize "alternative non-treaty methods of service," Carrington, supra note 64, at 749, unless, as is most unlikely, "any provisional or protective measure" includes service. See 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 166, at 173 ("Thus, the Convention does not intend to change the internal laws of the contracting states to the extent that they may permit the entry of temporary re straining orders, sequestration orders, or attachments of property ex parte. "); cf FED. R. First, the Hague Evidence Convention was intended primarily to apply to "evidence" in the sense of material required to prove or disprove alle gations at trial. It was not intended to apply to discovery in the sense of the search for material which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Second, there was some concern at the Hague Conference that United States litigants might endeavour to use the Convention for third party discovery, and Article 23 was inserted as an attempt (perhaps only partially successful in drafting terms) to make it clear that there was no obligation on Contracting States to allow the Convention to be used for third party discovery. This is so whether the discovery is of documents or by way of oral deposition. Third, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Convention was ever intended to apply to normal inter partes discovery, and not even the attempts of successive US delegations from 1978 onwards to encourage the use of the Convention fo r discovery appear to have envisaged anything other than third party discovery. 2 1 5 If Collins is right, it would appear that the U.S. has refi ned the art of unilateral international lawmaking. 2 1 6 And if he is right, then so was the Supreme Court in its conclusion that the Hague Evidence Convention does not limit the power of a United States court to order discovery from a foreign party over whom it has jurisdiction.217 That would, however, be a fortuity. In rejecting a fi rst resort rule,2 1 8 the majority again failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary fed eral statute. Rather, having concluded that the Convention does not explicitly provide such a rule, the majority declined to· analyze its power to create one. 2 1 9 Moreover, having considered the policies ani mating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,220 the majority focused only on what the Convention provides and on the requirements of in ternational comity rather than those of the Convention. 221 There is a risk of misunderstanding my claim that the Court in Aerospatiale "failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary federal statute. " That is, I believe, true in the sense that the Court failed, as it did in Schlunk, seriously to engage the policies animating the Conven tion and to consider the interpretive or federal common law rules they might reasonably be thought to require. 222 In fact, however, the Court [Vol. 89: 1456 treated the Convention very much like "an ordinary federal statute" with respect to its relationship to the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure. In domestic cases, the Court strains to avoid any inconsistency be tween the Fe deral Rules and subsequently enacted statutes, reasoning that Congress legislates against the background of those rules and re quiring clear evidence of an intent to displace any one of them in a specific substantive context.223 Whatever the factual basis for, or nor mative soundness of, this interpretive rule in domestic cases, 224 it is inimical to international law reform in procedure through bilateral or multilateral conventions.22 s
In light of the doubts harbored by the majority in Aerospatiale about the Court's power to fashion a common law rule of first resort under the Hague Evidence Convention226 -doubts that I believe are misplaced227 -it may come as a surprise that the Advisory Commit tee on Civil Rules published for comment a proposed amendment to Rule 26 that would have accomplished the same thing. The proposal would have required resort to an "applicable treaty or convention" in the case of discovery abroad, preserving discovery under the Federal Rules "if discovery conducted by such methods (was] inadequate or inequitable and additional discovery [was] not prohibited by the treaty or convention. "228
On the merits, there is much to be said for this proposal, which preferred Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Aerospatiale 229 to the opinion for the Court, although the comity it trumpeted might have been more apparent than reaJ.230 As Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, "foreign legal systems and foreign interests are impli cated,"231 and the Hague "Convention represents a political determi nation -one that, consistent with the principle of separation of powers, courts should not attempt to second-guess."232 A Federal Rule promulgated under the Enabling Act is not a statute, both be- 225. The notion that domestic interests expressed in court rules are "overriding" in the con text of interpreting a treaty, see supra note 220, could also cripple the process of concluding international agreements. cause it is not passed by Congress and because it is not signed by the President. 233 It makes no difference whether the vehicle of "second guessing" is common law or court rule. Moreover, it makes no differ ence that the content of a proposed rule is deemed to advance interna tional comity. Once the Supreme Court has authoritatively int e rpreted a treaty, the matter is for Congress and the President.
These objections were made to the Advisory Committee,234 and, for whatever reason, the proposed amendment to Rule 26 that is before the Supreme Court is not the proposed amendment that was published for comment. Unfortunately, the current text235 and its as sociated Advisory Committee Note23 6 are not a model of clarity. As has been noted by one of the authors of In ternational Civil Litiga tion, they suggest power to authorize "discovery on foreign territory in vio lation of foreign law."237 Even if not contrary to customary interna tional law,238 the exercise of such power could cause an international incident. In addition, the proposed amendment might be interpreted to supersede Aerospatiale, and hence the interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention therein, by making a comity analysis wholly dis cretionary in the case of discovery from parties and persons controlled by parties. 239 The new proposal is no more valid than the one it re placed, and the drafting history can only enhance suspicion that the rulemakers are out of their depth when dealing with international civil procedure. At the least, the experience should confirm the wisdom of 235. In the current text, Rule 26(a) includes the fo llowing proposed amendment: "Discovery at a place within a country having a treaty with the Un ited States app licable to such discovery shall be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless the court determines that those meth ods are inadequate or inequitable and authorizes other discovery methods not prohibited by the treaty." Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 56 (emphasis added).
236. See id. at 57-58.
237. In a remarkable and unpublicized reversal, the Committee now plans to propose a wholly different amendment to Rule 26(a). The new amendment would require use of the Convention (subject to an "inequity or inadequacy" exception) only where discovery would physically occur on fo reign territory -such as plant inspection or deposition. This amend ment wholly abandons the concurring opinion in Aerospatiale, and indeed appears to con template U.S.-ordered depositions on fo reign territory in violation of fo reign law. While district judges generally can be counted on to avoid such a result, as they have unanimously done so to date, the Committee's latest proposal is an unfortunate development. 239. Co mpare Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 57 ("However, comity may be em ployed in matters to which the requirement of the rule does not apply. Cf Societe Na tionale ... ") with Aerospatiale. 482 U.S. at 544 ("prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective") (footnote omitted).
following rulemaking procedures that would have brought the sub stantive problems to light. 240
The recent history of federal regulation of service of process and taking evidence abroad is thus one of unilateral efforts to bring the rest of the world to see it our way, with attempts to reach mutual under standing coming only after we staked out our positions. Those posi tions included a refusal to take seriously appeals to customary international law that did not accord with our views regarding the role of courts and litigation, and regarding territorial sovereignty. More over, the primary attempts to reach mutual understanding that we have made in these areas, the Hague Service and Evidence Conven tions, have been treated with less dignity than a garden variety federal statute by the Supreme Court, and they now are being treated with no more dignity by those responsible for proposing amendments to the Fe deral Rules of Civil Procedure.
The history alone suggests that customary international law can have only a walk-on part in this play. Given the controversy that has attended recent attempts to impute consequential restraining force to customary international law when sovereign interests, and therefore the traditional concerns of public international law, are much more apparent,241 that is not surprising.
Indeed, to a newcomer who approaches these matters from a do mestic perspective, it may not be clear whether customary interna tional law should have a significant (i. e. , nonsupporting) role in our courts, in this or any other play. 242 Recent historical scholarship may cause her to question hoary statements about the "law of nations" as part of our law,243 at least to question how it is that one branch of the "law of nations"244 and one alone escaped the domesticating discipline 242. See Trimble, supra note 47, passim; supra note 54. One could, of course, conclude that, although customary international law has no directly binding force in our courts, it may inform the content of federal law that the courts are authorized to make or apply. of the positivist revolution.24 5 Other recent scholarship adds to these historical inquiries questions about legitimacy and competence. 246 But these-are questions for another day.
Treaties, on the other hand, have a potentially significant role to play in international civil litigation. I have tried to demonstrate, how ever, that in interpreting treaties our courts need not resort to princi ples of "some underlying kind of justice"247 characteristic of a discrete field, and in particular that they do not need to resort to international law to interpret this kind of international lawmaking.248 On the con trary, in the process of interpretation treaties require the same sympa thetic respect, including respect for lawmaking compromises, that is due a federal statute. Whether subsequent lawmaking takes the form of federal common law or federal court rulemaking, the respect due is for lawmaking choices made through a process specially prescribed by our Constitution, one in which the President plays a special role. Notwithstanding Sch lunk and Aerospatiale, there may be reason for hope. In another recent decision interpreting a treaty on matters of international civil procedure (agreements to arbitrate), the Court man ifested both unwillingness "to subvert the spirit of the United States' accession" 249 and willingness "to subordinate domestic notions. "2 50 Perhaps, however, the Court's schizophrenic approach to treaties is simply a function of calculations about when it is in the judiciary's interest to share power.
IV. CONCLUSION
My doubts that there is or soon can be "a distinct, cohesive body of law" (p. 1) in international civil litigation or that the themes identi fied by the authors of In ternational Civil Litig ation warrant treatment of the topics they cover as a discrete field251 should not be permitted to obscure the great strengths of this book. The increasing importance of international trade to our economy and the consequent increase in in ternational litigation in our courts require lawyers who are equipped to meet the special demands that such litigation imposes. In terna tional Civil Litigation exposes those special demands with a degree of clarity, thoroughness, and sophistication that is unusual, let alone at the hands of those whose primary concern is the practice of law. Moreover, as this review may suggest, the materials challenge stu dents, scholars, and practitioners to reflect upon opportunities for in ternational cooperation and accommodation that have been missed in the past and on means to enhance cooperation and accommodation in the future.
The study of procedure is, or should be, a study in power. 252 Inter nation � ! Civil Litiga tion demonstrates that issues of power are no less important in the international than in the domestic sphere and that they are not confi ned to areas with obvious substantive implica tions. 253 Moreover, the history of domestic regulation of international procedure demonstrates that, however far from the surface the sub stantive implications lie, the major concern is, or should be, separation of powers, rather than federalism.2 54 But there is nothing new in that or in the refusal of the federal courts to acknowledge it. 255 multifactored analysis would be an improvement. Compare supra text accompanying note 82 (personal jurisdiction).
252. See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note I, at 1471-76.
253
. For one such area, see supra text accompanying notes 14-55 (legislative jurisdiction); see also Burbank, supra note 57, at 714 (" 'real procedure' is hard to find"). 255. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 755-62; Burbank, supra note 140, at 1185-97. Although the Supreme Court's recent decision upholding a Rule 11 sanction imposed on a represented client against a challenge under the Rules Enabling Act might be viewed as a simple reaffirma tion of past cases gutting that statute, see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933-34 (1991), two aspects of the decision are noteworthy. First, the Court was at pains to reiterate that Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting provision. See 111 S. Ct. at 934. Second, three members of the Court saw serious problems under the Enabling Act, and they voiced "concerns with respect to both separation of powers and federalism." Ill S. Ct. at 940 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This is progress.
